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Abstract
We compared 24-month-old children’s learning when their exposure to words came either in an interactive (coupled)
context or in a nonsocial (decoupled) context. We measured the children’s learning with two different methods: one in
which they were asked to point to the referent for the experimenter, and the other a preferential looking task in which they
were encouraged to look to the referent. In the pointing test, children chose the correct referents for words encountered in
the coupled condition but not in the decoupled condition. In the looking time test, however, they looked to the targets
regardless of condition. We explore the explanations for this and propose that the different response measures are
reflecting two different kinds of learning.
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Introduction
The word learning literature appears, at first glance at least, to
contain contradictory findings concerning the role of social
cognition in children’s word learning. It is widely accepted that
words are inherently social in nature - they are shared knowledge
that people use to direct one another’s attention to things in their
common environment [1]. A powerful demonstration of this social
dimension of word learning was provided by Baldwin and
colleagues [2]. In their study, children were exposed to novel
word-object pairings under two conditions. In the first ‘‘coupled’’
condition, an adult concurrently attending to an object with the
child produced the word. In a second ‘‘decoupled’’ condition, the
word was produced by an adult who the child could hear but not
see. The child believed this hidden speaker to be on the phone. In
a test phase, the child was asked comprehension questions and
appeared to have learned the word in the coupled but not in the
decoupled condition. It seems, then, that the children only learned
the words when they were produced by an adult who was present
and was jointly attending to the labeled object.
At the same time, we know from decades of study that humans
are voracious contingency learners (see [3] for a summary), and
that learning of sound patterns can occur even without conscious
attention [4]. Associative learning is central to some accounts of
word learning [5], and young children have been shown to learn
word-object mappings based on contingent presentation with no
social context [6], and even to perform complex inferences based
on patterns of such contingencies [7]. It seems odd, then, that the
absence of access to the speaker’s attentional state should
completely preclude such learning.
This paper attempts to reconcile this apparent contradiction.
We suggest that accounting for the Baldwin et al. result does not
require one to assume a total absence of learning in the decoupled
condition (in fact the authors of that paper do not make so strong a
claim). We explore the possibility that children are learning
associations in both conditions but that the response measure used
(asking the children for explicit points) requires either some
additional information or another kind of learning altogether.
The design of our study was as follows. As in [2], we exposed
children to word-object pairings in a coupled and a decoupled
condition, and tested whether they had learned the function of the
words by asking them to point to disambiguate a referential act.
We additionally tested the child’s knowledge using a preferential
looking test. We predicted that as in the original study, children
would fail to infer a referential function for the word in the
decoupled condition. However, since there was still co-exposure,
we predicted that the children would nonetheless form associations
between the word (or minimally some aspect of the labeling event;
we will return to this distinction in our discussion) and the object.
Crucially, we expected that this associative knowledge would show
up in our preferential looking test.
In preferential looking studies, the child is co-exposed to a novel
word (e.g., modi) and an object multiple times. They are then
shown a pair of objects (one of which is the just-named object) and
encouraged to look for the modi. In a number of studies, young
children have been shown to look preferentially to the labeled
object over the distractor [8–9] [6], thus indicating learning of a
word-object mapping. Other studies have explored conditions
under which children will fail to look preferentially to a labeled
object (e.g. when cues indicating that a label refers to a pictured
object conflict with one another [10]). Our goal in this study was to
test whether children might look preferentially even when in a
more explicit test they showed no sign of having inferred this
mapping.
In using preferential looking to test for awareness of a
potentially non-referential relationship between a word and an
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object, we are building on the finding that upon hearing words
people will look not only to their referents, but also to related
objects [11–13]. For example, Moores, Laiti, and Chelazzi [14]
reported that when adults were exposed to a word and to an array
of objects, including an object associated with that word (e.g. they
read the word motorbike and the array included a helmet), they
looked to the associated target significantly more than to the
unrelated distractors. The claim here is not that gaze behavior
does not reflect children’s social learning, or their understanding of
the referential intentions of others. There is in fact much evidence
that gaze does reflect children’s understanding of others’ intentions
from early in development (referential [15–16] and otherwise [17–
18]). The point is rather that it also seems to reflect other kinds of
learning. There is even evidence that gaze reflects implicit
knowledge that is not available to conscious attention [19–20]. If
we conceptualize what the child is doing during a preferential
looking study as a search for the referent, we might reasonably
expect that search to reflect information that is not exclusively
semantic. Sabbagh and Shafman found [21] that children formed
episodic memories linking words to objects, even when that
knowledge was not reflected in the answers the children gave to
specifically semantic questions about the words. We might expect
such knowledge to affect a child’s visual search for a referent and
thus to show up in a preferential looking test.
We therefore employed (1) a preferential looking test, presenting
images with no social context at test, and (2) a disambiguation of
reference test of the kind employed by Baldwin and colleagues [2].
Our prediction was that the pointing test would reveal learning of
the word in the coupled condition only, but that children would
nonetheless look preferentially to the target object for words
encountered in both the coupled and the decoupled condition.
Methods
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the Max Planck Institute for
Evolutionary Anthropology Child Subjects Committee. The
studies were conducted with the written informed consent of the
children’s parents, and in accordance with all applicable laws and
rules governing psychological research in Germany.
Participants
Thirty-two normally developing monolingual German-speaking
children of approximately 24 months of age (23–25 months,
mean= 24 months; 15 boys) were included in the study. A further
thirteen children had to be excluded because of parental
interference (5), fussiness (4), experimenter error (1), identification
of novel objects with familiar names (1), failure to produce points
to either novel object (1), or directing all 8 points in a test block to
the same side (1). Children were recruited from a database of
parents who had agreed to their participation in studies. The
sample was predominantly white and middle-class.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of a warm-up followed by two blocks,
each consisting of a training phase (one condition in the first block
and one in the second block, with order counterbalanced) and a
testing phase. The warm-up took place in a separate room near
the testing room and lasted 10–15 minutes, during which the child
played with Experimenter 2 (E2) and then Experimenter 1 (E1).
After excusing herself, E2 went to the testing room, sat hidden
from all but a small area of the room by a screen, and began
simulating a telephone conversation. The child and their caregiver
then entered the room with E1. E1 took the child across the room
to a place from which E2 was visible and explained that E2 was on
the phone with her grandmother. E1 then took the child and their
caregiver to a table and chairs in the center of the room. The child
sat on their caregiver’s lap at the table, facing the screen that hid
E2, upon which two monitors were mounted at the child’s eye
level. E2 observed the child via closed-circuit television.
The first training phase then began, during which E1 and the
child would play with a pair of unfamiliar novel toys. E1 sat in a
chair at the table at a 90u angle to the child. E1 removed the first
toy from a bucket under the table and presented it to the child.
The child was allowed to play with this toy for 30 seconds. E1
looked at the object while the child played with it, before
eventually taking the toy from the child and handing over the next
toy. If the child’s attention to the object waned, E1 would handle
the object in order to bring their attention back to it. E2 continued
to simulate a telephone conversation for this phase, but limited
vocalizations to ‘‘hmm!’’ or ‘‘aha!’’. While the child played with
one of the two toys, it was labeled with a novel non-word under
one of the following conditions.
Coupled: In this condition, E1 looked at the toy and produced
its label (e.g., ‘‘ein Modi!’’) while the child attended to the object.
This was produced a total of three times at approximately 10-
second intervals over the 30 seconds.
Decoupled: In this condition E2 (who was monitoring the child
via closed-circuit television) said the name of the toy (e.g., ‘‘ein
Modi!’’) while the child attended to it. This was produced a total of
three times at approximately 10-second intervals over the 30
seconds.
Each child was trained in both conditions. Whether the first or
the second toy in each block was labeled was counterbalanced
across conditions. The two labels used – ‘‘modi’’ and ‘‘dena’’ –
occurred equally in each condition and ordering. The order of the
four toys was kept constant, meaning they occurred equally with
each label, each training/testing ordering, and each condition. For
one participant a fourth label was produced in error at the end of
the 30-second period in the decoupled condition.
Two kinds of test were administered for each block, with their
order counterbalanced over the orderings of training conditions.
The experimenter conducting the test was counterbalanced across
conditions, with half of the children tested by E1 (the experimenter
who had been present when the novel toy was played with) and
half by E2 (the experimenter who had been hidden when the novel
toy was played with). The non-testing experimenter concealed
herself behind the screen for the duration. Both tests began with
the child being told to attend to the screens in front of them and
proceeded as follows.
Pointing: The testing experimenter kneeled in front of the child,
with her head positioned between the two monitors on the screen
behind her, and asked the child to help her. She would then say,
‘‘Zeig mir doch mal bitte, wo is der/die/das NOUN’’ (show me
please, where is the NOUN; the novel words were always used
with the neuter article das), as the non-testing experimenter pressed
a button to display images on each of the screens. If the child
pointed, s/he was thanked and the images disappeared. If the child
did not respond, the testing experimenter repeated ‘‘wo is der/
die/das NOUN’’ up to 4 times more. There were 8 object pairs in
total, with 4 consisting of the same two objects with which the
child had just played (always the labeled object paired with the
non-labeled object). The noun produced was the non-word with
which that object had been ‘‘labeled.’’ The side where the target
object appeared was alternated and these trials were interspersed
in a set order with 4 pairs of familiar objects. The child’s response
was recorded from an overhead camera.
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For two children it was necessary to cut one of the pointing test
blocks short due to fussiness. One child who failed to respond to
the first request for a point on at least one trial for either object was
replaced, so all children analyzed produced at least a single
codeable point. Children produced an average of 3.6 points in the
coupled condition, and 3.7 points in the decoupled condition. A
paired t test confirmed that there was no difference between
conditions in the number of points provided (t(31) = 0.533,
p = 0.60, d=0.059). The number of prompts used to elicit the
point was 1.14 in the coupled condition and 1.13 in the decoupled
condition. A paired t test confirmed that there was no difference
between conditions in the number of prompts provided
(t(30) = 0.198, p = 0.84, d=0.054).
Preferential looking: The testing experimenter asked the child to
watch the screens while she read a book and then sat behind the
child and parent where she was not visible to either. When the
non-testing experimenter (who was monitoring the child’s
attention) pressed a button, an image of an object appeared on
each screen and remained there for 6 seconds. After 2 seconds a
recorded voice (the testing experimenter, which could be E1– the
present-during-training experimenter – or E2– the hidden-during-
training experimenter) said ‘‘wo ist das NOUN?’’ (where is the
NOUN). In each case the noun referred to one of the displayed
objects; the other object was a distractor. After each object pair the
non-testing experimenter would cause a face between the two
screens to light up in order to draw the child’s gaze back to the
center. There were 12 object pair displays in total, with 4
consisting of the two objects with which the child had just played
(the labeled object paired with the non-labeled object; these trials
were interspersed in a set order with 8 pairs of familiar objects),
and the spoken noun being the non-word with which that object
had been ‘‘labeled.’’ The recordings for the two novel labels for a
given experimenter were created by splicing the noun into the
same recording and timed so that the onset of the target noun
occurred at the same time point (2.67 seconds following the first
appearance of the objects for one speaker and 2.70 seconds for the
other. Each recording and each speaker occurred equally in each
condition). The side on which the target object appeared was
varied. The child’s gaze was recorded using a camera placed
equidistant between the two monitors.
Coding
A research assistant who was blind to the location of the target
coded the recordings of the pointing test, indicating whether the
child pointed left, pointed right, or produced no clear point for
each image pair. Forty percent of the data was coded in the same
way by a second research assistant. Agreement between coders was
excellent (93.1%, k= .881).
Another research assistant, also blind to the location of the
target object, judged on a frame-by-frame basis where the child
was gazing for the looking trials, indicating ‘‘looking left,’’ ‘‘looking
right,’’ ‘‘looking elsewhere,’’ or ‘‘uncodeable.’’ The coder could
control the speed while watching the 25 frames per second of the
recordings. Twenty percent of the data was second coded.
Correlation between the percentage of looks that each coder
judged to be in the target direction for each participant for each
time period and condition over all trials was very high (Pearson’s
r=0.994), indicating excellent agreement.
Results
Pointing
The mean proportion of trials or points made for which
children pointed to the target is shown in Table 1. A paired t test
confirmed that the difference between the number of points made
to the target and those made to the distractor was significantly
greater in the coupled than in the decoupled condition
(t(31) = 2.1676, p,0.05, d=0,383). Reanalyzing the data using
the proportion of completed trials in which the child pointed to the
target, instead of this difference score for points made, revealed
essentially identical results (t(31) = 1.745, p,0.05, d = 0.365).
We further analyzed our data by fitting mixed-effects logistic
regression models to the data from all trials completed. Our
outcome was the direction of the point, and the key predictor was
the location of the target object – the extent to which the location
of the target affects the location to which a child points being the
natural indication of their accuracy. Child (N=32) was included
as a random effect on the intercept in all models to account for
between-participant differences. In a null model with no predictors
the log odds for the intercept were not significantly different from
0 (z =20.163, p = 0.871, indicating that that the children did not
have a side bias.
Our first analysis with predictors was a single model testing the
interaction between condition and location of target as predictors,
thus providing a test of how accuracy varied by condition. This
was found to give a significantly better fit to the data than a model
including only child and location of target (x2(2) = 10.6, p,0.01,
Log-likelihood ratio index [22]; hereafter LLRI= 0.032) and than
a model with only child, location of target, and condition but no
interaction (x2(1) = 9.9, p,0.01, LLRI= 0.030), with the children’s
accuracy being significantly less in the decoupled condition
(B=21,79, SE= 0.055, z =23.23, p,0.01). We therefore built
separate models for each condition. The addition of the location of
the object to a model containing only child significantly improved
the fit of the model (x2(1) = 11.07, p,0.001, LLRI= 0.063) in
accounting for pointing in the coupled condition, with the target
object being on a particular side significantly increasing the
probability that the child would point there (B = 1.276,
SE= 0.377, z = 3.39, p,0.0001). The location of the object was
not found to be useful in predicting where children would point in
the decoupled condition (x2(1) = 0.8, p= 0.371, LLRI= 0.005).
Next we looked at whether the number of prompts provided
(which as noted above did not vary between conditions) might be
predictive of children’s performance. We found that a model with
an interaction between target location and the number of prompts
did not give an improvement in fit over a model in which the only
predictor was target location (x2(2) = 2.56, p = 0.278,
LLRI= 0.008), indicating that points produced in response to
multiple points were no less likely to be correct than points
produced in response to a single prompt.
Finally we looked at the impact of the various counterbalanced
factors on children’s behavior. Adding an interaction between the
location of the target and whether the test was performed by the
experimenter who had been present during training or the
experimenter who had been hidden did not give an improvement
in fit over a model with only location of target included. This
Table 1. The mean proportion of trials/points for which
children pointed to the requested novel object (standard
deviation in parentheses).
COUPLED DECOUPLED
PROP. OF TRIALS WITH POINT TO TARGET .578 (.356) .445 (.363)
PROP. OF POINTS MADE TO TARGET .637 (.361) .478 (.371)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049881.t001
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applied for either the full data set (x2(2) = 0.13, p = 0.938,
LLRI= 0.0004) or the coupled (x2(2) = 0.62, p = 0.735,
LLRI= 0.0037) or decoupled (x2(2) = 1.87, p = 0.3926,
LLRI= 0.0111) condition data in isolation. We also looked at
whether the order in which the tests occurred (pointing and then
looking or looking and then pointing) affected accuracy. Adding an
interaction between the location of target and the order of test
gave a marginal improvement in fit for the coupled data
(x2(2) = 5.07, p = 0.079, LLRI= 0.031) with participant accuracy
being slightly higher when pointing came first, but not significantly
(B = 1.172, SE= 0.772, z = 1.517, p = 0.129), but gave no
improvement for the decoupled data (x2(2) = 3.676, p = 0.159,
LLRI= 0.0218). The absence of word knowledge in the decoupled
condition thus cannot be attributed to prior exposure to the
looking test.
Looking
The average proportions of looks that were toward the target
over the 6 seconds is shown in Figure 1. To test for changes in
looking preference resulting from hearing an object label, we
compared the child’s behavior in the 2600 milliseconds immedi-
ately prior to word onset (during which the object pairs were
displayed on the screen), with their behavior in the 2600 ms after.
We calculated the proportion of the 25 frames per second in these
time windows in which the child’s looks towards either object were
made to the target. We then compared the children’s looking to
the target before the word onset with their looking after.
Comparing before and after in this way controls for any gaze
bias that is independent of the production of the label (such as a
preference for attending to objects that have previously been
labeled [23]). We will return to this point in our discussion. In the
coupled condition, the children made an average.491 (SD= .147)
of these looks to the target before word onset, compared to.554
(SD= .198) in the 2600 ms after word onset. In the decoupled
condition, the children made an average.461 (SD= .158) of their
looks to the target before word onset, compared to.542 (SD= .213)
after word onset. We conducted a 262 analysis of variance for
these proportions with time and condition both as within-subject
factors. The analysis found a main effect of time (before word
onset or after; F(1,31) = 6.019, p = 0.02, r= .163) but no effect of
condition (F(1,31) = .269, p = 0.607, r= .009) and no interaction
between time and condition (F(1,31) = 0.095, p= .760, r= .003).
This indicates that the children showed a significantly greater
preference for looking to the target after word onset, regardless of
condition. We performed one-sample t tests to ensure that the
difference found was not a result of a pre-word-onset preference
for the distractor. These confirmed that looking to the target was
significantly above chance (50%) after word onset (t(31) = 1.81,
p = 0.04, d= .319), but no different from chance before. To allow
time for the programming of eye saccades, some previous
researchers have excluded as much as the first 300 ms [24] post-
word onset from their analyses. We thus conducted an additional
analysis in which the first 300 ms were excluded from both
2600 ms windows. The same pattern of results was found. Finally,
the same pattern of results was found when we reduced the post-
word window by 800 ms to 1800 ms, or extended it by 800 ms to
include the full period for which the objects remained on-screen.
As a further check that the children’s looking toward the target
objects was indeed a result of the label being produced, we
performed a word-contingent switching analysis (see, for example,
[25]). In such an analysis, a child’s looking behavior is classified as
either correct or incorrect. If they are looking at the distractor at
word onset and they switch within a specified word window (but
not within the first 300 ms), or if they are looking at the target and
stay looking at the target throughout the window, then their
response is classified as correct. If they switch from the target
within the window, or stay looking at the distractor for full
duration, then the response is classified as incorrect. We employed
the same window (1800 ms) as Fernald and colleagues [25]. We
calculated the proportion of trials on which participants were
correct, and then tested whether the participants were correct at a
level greater than chance. They were correct an average of 59.9%
of the time in both the coupled condition (t(30) = 1.436, p = 0.081,
d=0.2578396) and in the decoupled condition (t(31) = 1.917,
p = 0.032, d=0.3387843). A t test confirms that there was no
significant difference between the accuracy rates in the two
conditions (t(30) = 0.1584, p= 0.875, d=0.04).
The Relationship between Pointing and Looking
The two sets of analyses above suggest a dissociation between
the knowledge displayed in the different tests. To further explore
this, we tested whether children that showed evidence of a word-
object mapping in the looking test were more likely than other
children to point correctly. We did this by subtracting each child’s
looking preference before word onset (in our looking experiment)
from their looking preference after word onset to give a single
difference score and adding this to the logistic regression models
used to analyze the pointing data – including an interaction
between the location of the target object (our measure of accuracy)
and the difference score. Including this interaction offered a
significant improvement in fit over a model including just child
and target location (x2(2) = 16.399, p,0.001, LLRI= 0.049).
However, yet a further improvement in fit was given by adding
a three-way interaction between target location, difference score
and condition (x2(4) = 13.045, p,0.05, LLRI= 0.041), indicating
that the extent to which looking behavior was predictive of
pointing accuracy varied with condition. We therefore built
separate models for the two conditions. For the coupled data,
adding an interaction between target location and the difference
score gave an improvement in fit over a model with just child and
target location included (x2(2) = 14.189, p,0.001, LLRI= 0.086),
with the probability that a child would point accurately increasing
as the child’s difference score increased (B= 6.65, SE=1.88,
z = 3.546, p,0.001). For the decoupled data, however, the
addition of such an interaction gave no improvement in fit
(x2(2) = 3.47, p=0.176, LLRI= 0.021). This indicates that looking
behavior is useful in predicting pointing behavior for word-object
pairings encountered under coupled conditions but not for those
encountered under decoupled conditions.
Discussion
There is uncertainty in the cognitive sciences as to what
processes support word learning. We set out to explore the role of
word-object association. We found (replicating [2]) that children
do not show explicit knowledge of words when merely co-exposed
to words and objects. Crucially, however, we found in a
preferential looking test that the same children showed a
significant preference for looking toward the target object when
they heard the label, regardless of whether they had encountered a
referential use of that label or had merely been co-exposed to the
word/object pair. Our analysis showed that children preferentially
looked to the target object only after label onset, indicating that it
was not simply a preference for attending to a previously-labeled
object over the unlabeled object with which each target was
paired.
We interpret our results as confirmation that word-object
association has a role in word learning – we found that children’s
Decoupling Contingency Learning & Social Learning
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looking behavior was predictive of their pointing behavior when
learning occurred in the coupled (but not the decoupled)
condition. However, we also interpret the result as evidence that
such association is only one aspect of what is required for a child to
show explicit knowledge of a word’s meaning – while it appears to
be a necessary condition of knowing a word, it is not sufficient to
support at least one behavioral response. This, to our knowledge,
is the first work to find such a dissociation for children’s word
learning. It joins a growing body of research indicating that
different behavioral responses reveal different knowledge, both
linguistic and non-linguistic and in both children [26–28] and
adults [29–31].
The first theoretical question raised by our study concerns what
the child is missing experientially in the decoupled condition. The
essential difference is that in the coupled condition the adult is
attending to the object and to the child while producing the label.
A great deal of other work supports the observation that speaker’s
gaze is important in children’s learning of words [32–34]. A
common way of understanding the importance of gaze is as
marking for the child that the contingency between the production
of the label and the presence of (or the child’s attending to) the
object is deliberate. It is possible that this lack of intentionality
results in the child’s failure to learn a symbolic representation in
our study. Perhaps the leanest way to think about this is that the
child encounters a great many contingencies between sounds and
objects, many of which may be misleading rather than indicative
of a pattern that can be generalized to other situations. That the
contingency is intended (or caused) by an adult speaker reduces
the probability that it was purely coincidental and encourages the
child to encode it as a word meaning.
Another possibility is that it is the sharedness of the label that is
important – that the children understand something about the
conventional nature of words. Nelson makes a useful distinction
when she writes [35] that there are ‘‘three different kinds of
meaning: subjective meaning, established within the individual’s
meaning system as a whole; shared meaning, established between
two or more speakers within a given context; and objective
meaning, a repository of the culture’’ (pp.11–12). Word-object
mapping is purely subjective – it is an individual’s awareness of a
relationship between a word and an object. According to this
account, what is missing from the child’s knowledge when s/he has
formed such a representation is an awareness of the ‘‘shared
meaning’’ of the word – an awareness that others share the
mapping (acquired by the contingency occurring within a shared
attentional frame in which the child is a participant or of which the
child is an observer; see, for example, [36–38] for examples of
word learning in the latter situation). Speaker intentions play a role
in such an explanation, but this account also requires that the child
have some awareness of the conventional status of words. The
ability of young children to track what experiences are shared and
not shared has been shown in both linguistic [39] and non-
linguistic contexts [40–41]. It has been found [42] that 24-month
Figure 1. Mean proportion of children’s looks directed at the target object (word onset is at 0).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049881.g001
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olds understand that object labels are shared across speakers while
object preferences are not, suggesting that they understand
something about the conventional status of words.
A final possibility is that children’s knowledge is specific to
particular tasks or domains of action. A number of writers [27]
[43] have argued that children’s knowledge should not be
separated from the tasks for which it is deployed. In our study
both the coupled and the decoupled condition involved social
engagement, but the coupled condition involved more interaction
as the present experimenter delivered the label. Similarly the
pointing test involves more social engagement than the looking
test. It is possible that situations of social interaction will only elicit
behaviors that have been learned in similar interactive situations,
and that this accounts for the pattern of responses we see.
Speaking against this account, however, is the fact that the words
learned in the coupled condition showed up in the looking test,
where there was no social prompting. It also appears that any such
an effect is not a matter of straightforward perceptual overlap
between the training and testing situations as it made no difference
which experimenter (previously present/previously hidden) per-
formed the pointing test.
A second question is why the child should learn about the
contingency at all in the decoupled condition. Since the label
uttered is not a conventional label, it might seem better for the
child to simply ignore it. We would argue that if – as we have
suggested – word-object association is a component of word
knowledge, it would be useful for the child to track this
relationship. Although the contingent use of the label by the
hidden speaker cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of a word,
it does certainly increase the probability that there is a
conventional relationship between the two elements, for which
corroborating evidence might be provided later. Thus the stored
representation of this contingency might later be combined with
other evidence in order to learn a word.
A parallel discussion can be found in the literature on children’s
avoidance of learning words from unreliable speakers, where it has
been asked whether children simply ignore word-object pairings
encountered under such conditions, or remember the event but do
not integrate it into their lexical knowledge. Sabbagh and
Shafman present evidence [21] that children have episodic
memory for labels from unreliable speakers but do not form
semantic representations from them, attributing this to an adaptive
mechanism that they call ‘‘semantic gating.’’ If the pattern we
report is the result of a related semantic ‘‘gating’’ in the decoupled
condition, it raises very interesting questions about how the
pattern seen in our study might vary with age. The ability to reject
word-object contingencies as being non-conventional (or non-
intentional) might be a relatively late development. Younger
children might make no distinction between the words learned in
our two conditions, such that both would show up in their
pointing. The knowledge reflected in pointing and looking might
be the same at younger ages, and diverge later.
A third important question is whether this difference is
qualitative or quantitative – whether the pointing and looking-
time tests reflect partially different cognitive mechanisms, or
whether, due to differing demands, they simply require different
strengths of representation. While we cannot rule out this second
explanation, our results provide no support for it. If the
representations employed differed only quantitatively, we might
expect that the children who pointed accurately would also be
those who looked more to the target. However we only found such
a relationship in the coupled condition.
The suggestion that there are two qualitatively different
mechanisms at least partially at work is consistent with the
findings that intentional processes rely on different learning
mechanisms [44] and brain substrates [45] [31] than do implicit
ones. Three-, five-, and eight-year-olds have been found [46] to be
disadvantaged relative to adults in the former kind of learning, but
closer in the latter. Related evidence of a dissociation between
kinds of knowledge in young children comes from findings [47]
that two-year-olds are able to produce and suppress sequence
knowledge that has been learned incidentally, but are not able to
control information learned as explicit rules until much later [48].
As we mentioned in the introduction, implicit knowledge has also
been found to affect where adults look during visual search [19–
20]. To relate this back to the discussion above, it seems plausible
that knowledge of intended contingencies or shared meanings
would be under conscious control, while we might expect word-
object associations to be implicit in many cases.
One question that requires further research is the effect of our
decision to label only one object in each condition, meaning that
our distractor objects were unlabeled. As mentioned above, our
analysis showed that children’s looking to the target object
following label onset was a response to the utterance in our study,
and not simply a preference for attending to objects that had
previously been labeled. Nonetheless, real word understanding
often requires the ability to discriminate the label from other
possible labels in order to uniquely determine a referent. No such
discrimination was necessary in order for our children to look
preferentially post-word onset in our study. It is clear that the
children are showing evidence of having learned a contingency
between the object and some aspect of the ‘‘labeling’’ event in both
conditions. Hence we have discovered the dissociation we
predicted. However, it is possible that the child’s association is
between the object and some broader property of the utterance
(some aspect of the human voice), and not necessarily the word’s
distinguishing phonemes. Further work will be necessary to see
whether the dissociation we have reported remains in a more
demanding design where the child’s utterance contingent gaze
relies on the formation of a robust representation for the sound of
the word.
One final question that these results raise is methodological –
given these findings, how should we evaluate children’s word
learning? We would argue that we need a diverse approach. Our
experiment demonstrates clearly that using an implicit measure
like gaze-tracking is necessary in order to identify some kinds of
knowledge in young children. On the other hand, the result also
suggests that gaze-tracking should not be treated as merely a
replacement for explicit tests of knowledge. Its particular value
appears to be as a tool for studying different, and seemingly
dissociable, aspects of linguistic knowledge.
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